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Abstract—This paper provides an overview of an ongoing 
NSF project that is intended to improve the long-term quality of 
care for patients suffering from early stage Parkinson’s disease. 
Due to facial masking in the patient, a stigmatization often occurs 
in their relationship with the caregiver due to the inability to 
adequately perceive the patient’s emotional state. We are 
developing robot co-mediators to assist in the transmission of this 
information through the use of artificial moral emotions that 
trigger suitable proxemic expressions in the robot, with the goal 
of ensuring that the quality of the patient-caregiver relationship 
is preserved. 
Keywords—Parkinson’s Disease, moral emotions, human 
dignity, intelligent robots 
I. INTRODUCTION  
     As robotics moves toward ubiquity in our society, there has 
been little concern for the consequences of this proliferation 
[27]. Robotic systems are close to being pervasive, with 
applications involving human-robot relationships already in 
place or soon to occur, involving warfare, childcare, eldercare, 
and personal and potentially intimate relationships. Without 
sounding alarmist, it is important to understand the nature and 
consequences of this new technology on human-robot 
relationships. To ensure societal expectations are met, this 
requires an interdisciplinary scientific endeavor to model and 
incorporate ethical behavior into these intelligent artifacts 
from the onset, not as a post hoc activity. 
     Our laboratory has pioneered research in the application of 
ethics in robotic systems, including the development of an 
ethical governor capable of restricting lethal behavior [6], and 
an ethical adaptor that uses the artificial emotion of guilt to 
affect the available behavioral repertoire consistent with moral 
restraint [7]. 
     There remains much more to be done however, and not just 
for the military. While there exists a nascent machine ethics 
research community, it has focused largely on developmental 
ethics, often from a purely philosophical perspective, where an 
agent develops its own sense of right and wrong in situ. In 
general, these approaches largely ignore the moral emotions as 
a scientific basis worthy of consideration (e.g., [1]). There is 
little fundamental or pragmatic research being conducted to 
ensure that the intelligent robotic systems we create can model 
and understand our own condition, respond to it in an ethical 
manner, and preserve the dignity of those people it interacts 
with.   
     Currently, there is surprisingly little work on mechanisms 
that will allow robots to behave in a manner that is ethical and 
sensitive to the moral context and social norms. This is 
particularly worrisome as simple robots are already entering 
society without any notion of ethically acceptable behavior 
and this situation will only be exacerbated in the future if 
various kinds of social and assistive robots will cause humans 
to form unidirectional emotional bonds with robots without 
those robots being sensitive to human emotions and feelings 
[24]. In this NSF funded project involving researchers at both 
Georgia Tech and Tufts University, we tackle a hitherto 
completely overlooked ethical aspect of human-robot 
interaction: maintenance of human dignity and the 
stigmatization of human patients. Unfortunately, in certain 
health conditions such as early stage Parkinson's disease (PD), 
it has been shown that the patient caregiver relationship is at 
risk of deterioration due to disease symptoms that can create 
inaccurate and negative impressions of the patient’s character . 
This stigmatization is a serious problem in ensuring the 
dignity and quality of care that affects both parties in this 
dyadic relationship.   
     We are studying ways to minimize the opportunity for such 
stigmatization to occur. The overarching scientific goal of this 
project is two-fold: (1) to develop a robotic architecture 
endowed with moral emotional control mechanisms, abstract 
moral reasoning, and a theory of mind that allow robots to be 
sensitive to human affective and ethical demands, and (2) to 
develop a specific instance of the architecture for a robot 
mediator between people with “facial masking” due to PD that 
reduces their ability to signal emotion, pain, personality and 
intentions to their family caregivers, and health care providers 
who may misinterpret the lack of emotional expressions as 
disinterest and an inability to adhere to treatment regimen, 
resulting in stigmatization [34]. Specific questions we are 
addressing include: (1) How can an expanded set of moral 
emotions, particularly empathy, be modeled and exhibited by 
robots to provide quantitatively better care of patients, in 
particular, early patients with PD. (2) How can we develop a 
theory of mind of both caregiver and patient (including their 
goals and emotional states) that can be used by a robotic 
mediator to improve the quality of care for patients while 
enhancing the dignity of both patient and caregiver? 
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     To date, there is little fundamental or pragmatic research 
being conducted to ensure that the intelligent robotic systems 
we create can model and understand our own condition, 
respond to it in an ethical manner, and preserve the dignity of 
people interacting with those systems. This is, however, 
especially important for co-robots that are supposed to interact 
with physically and mentally challenged populations in 
healthcare settings. In particular, Parkinson’s patients present 
a large target group where co-robots with moral cognitive 
mechanisms could make a significant impact both in terms of 
alleviating pressure on health care providers, improving the 
interactions between them and their patients, and reducing 
patient stigma and restoring human dignity. 
     In this paper, we focus on the role of moral emotions in 
maintaining patient dignity, leveraging our earlier work in 
ethical robotic architectures, specifically the use of an ethical 
adaptor to model and regulate interactions between a robot 
and a human patient-caregiver dyad. 
II. DIGNITY IN HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 
     Ethical treatment of physically and mentally challenged 
populations (such as the war wounded, the elderly, children, 
etc.) is a crucial adjunct to technological advancement in their 
care.  We must not lose sight of the fundamental rights human 
beings possess as we create a society that is more and more 
automated. Our research is intended to address fundamental 
aspects of dignity in human-robot relationships [20]: 
encroachments on people’s autonomy, maintenance of 
privacy, freedom from strong or continued pain, and 
maintenance of self-respect and personal identity. The 
introduction of robotic technology should not infringe upon 
these basic human rights. Violation of a person’s dignity 
results in their degradation, an obviously undesirable effect 
that could result as these robotic systems are moved into 
people’s homes, businesses, and institutions. To ensure this 
does not occur, robot system designers must not only think of 
the efficiency of their artifacts but also the ethical 
ramifications of their design choices. 
    This paper addresses the moral affective aspects of the 
system. We have extensive experience in the area, having 
developed a complex time-varying affective model for 
humanoids as part of our research for Samsung [18] and an 
architecture for use in Sony’s AIBO and QRIO robots [4,5]. 
The ethical adaptor component developed in our research for 
the military has dealt to date with only one of the moral 
affective functions (guilt) [7]. But there are many others that 
are far more relevant to the patient-caregiver relationship.  
     It has been stated that in order for an autonomous agent to 
be truly ethical, emotions may be required at some level:  
“While the Stoic view of ethics sees emotions as irrelevant 
and dangerous to making ethically correct decisions, the 
more recent literature on emotional intelligence suggests 
that emotional input is essential to rational behavior” [1]. 
Gazzaniga [12] identifies three neuroscientific aspects of 
moral cognition: (1) moral emotions, which are centered in the 
brainstem and limbic system; (2) theory of mind, which 
enables us to judge how others both act and interpret our 
actions to guide our own social behavior, where mirror 
neurons, the medial structure of the amygdala, and the 
superior temporal sulcus are all implicated in this activity; and 
(3) abstract moral reasoning, which uses many different 
components of the brain.  
      These emotions guide our intuitions in determining ethical 
judgments, although this is not universally agreed upon. Haidt 
[13] provides a taxonomy of moral emotions: Other-
condemning (Contempt, Anger, Disgust); Self-conscious 
(Shame, Embarrassment, Guilt); Other-Suffering 
(Compassion); Other-Praising (Gratitude, Elevation). Using 
the same methods we have in the past [4], we will allow these 
emotions to bias the behavior of the system in a way which 
supports a more extensive set of moral emotions, and as 
appropriate maintain a theory of mind representation of the 
affective state of the robot’s human counterpart in the 
relationship in order to act in manner that fosters their 
emotional state in a manner consistent with enhancing their 
dignity. Our recent work in this area appears in [37]. 
III. THE PROBLEM: CAREGIVER-PATIENT STIGMATIZATION  
     The prevalence of Parkinson’s disease (PD), one of the 
most common age-related neurodegenerative disorders [39] is 
characterized by a progressive decline in speed, flexibility, 
fluidness and coordination of movement throughout the face 
and body that curtails the person’s ability to non-verbally 
express feelings, thoughts and intentions to others. People 
with PD are able to self-report accurately about their interior 
psychological traits and states, yet their verbal reports are 
often ignored when delivered with an inexpressive face since 
the face is one of the most salient and influential mediums of 
social interaction [34]. The frozen position of pressed or slack 
lips and an unbroken stare creates the impression, regardless 
of its accuracy, of an asocial, cold, incompetent or apathetic 
person who fails to reciprocate others’ feelings of warmth, 
concern, interest or excitement [9]. The mask interferes with 
social observers’ formation of accurate impressions regardless 
of whether the observer is a layperson or a health care 
practitioner [15,35]. The experience for people with masking 
is an imprisonment of the self in an unresponsive face and 
body [3], feeling misunderstood, isolated and lonely [32]. 
Socially and mentally competent people with masking are 
confronted with the challenge of clearly presenting a self that 
overrides observers’ automatic and confidently formed 
impressions of incompetence [21].  
     Kurzban and Leary [16] theorize that one of the origins of 
stigmatization lies in the fundamental social function of 
dyadic cooperation and the predictability of human behavior 
for this cooperation to occur. When individuals can quickly 
decipher one another’s thoughts and actions, they are able to 
respond effectively as a unit to the task at hand and to predict 
social and task outcomes. Decipherability is contingent on 
visible and dynamic physical displays of emotion, thought and 
motivation. By reducing physical cues of psychological states 
and traits, facial masking makes it less possible for observers 
to form reliable impressions of people with PD. When patients 
are masked there is a smaller correlation between the patients’ 
tested social attributes and observers’ impressions of these 
attributes than when patients are more facially expressive [15]. 
This indecipherability sets the stage for social response biases 
and stereotype activation as the social observer attempts to 
understand an ambiguous situation. The lack of predictability 
and the reduced perceived trustworthiness of the facially 
masked patient in comparison to more expressive patients may 
explain why observers have negative responses to facial 
masking [35]. People who are more expressive are liked more 
and viewed as more trustworthy than are less expressive 
individuals [8]. For example, poor ability to mobilize upper 
face muscles that produce the eye crinkling of genuine smiling 
can create a look of deceptive smiling and untrustworthiness 
in people with PD even though they are experiencing genuine 
happiness [22]. Consequently, a patient with facial masking 
enters the health care relationship with, in the words of 
Goffman [14], a “spoiled identity” created by a special kind of 
association between attribute and stereotype. The attribute is 
the muting of facial expressivity and the stereotype is 
observers’ preconceptions about the meaning of muted 
expressivity. The health care stigmatization of facial masking 
has been documented in both western and eastern cultures, yet 
the quality of the stigmatization is characterized by local 
moral codes, suggesting that masking violates the implicit 
moral norms of social interaction [35,40].  
     When a situation is uncertain, perceivers resolve 
uncertainty by drawing upon previously formed implicit 
cultural and normative attitudes and beliefs to form a rapid 
judgment, after which they become overconfident in the 
correctness of the judgment and are resistant to revising their 
initial judgments in subsequent encounters [23,26,31,36]. This 
overconfidence is augmented by automatic selective attention 
to evidence that confirms the impression and neglect of 
disconfirming evidence [23,26]. In general, practitioners have 
been found to often form incorrect initial impressions of 
patients’ interior experiences and perspectives, and inaccuracy 
can compromise the formation of therapeutic alliances and 
successful interventions. Practitioner accuracy improves when 
patients are active rather than passive providers of information 
in the encounter [31]. Co-robots could facilitate patients’ 
empowerment as active participants in health care and 
simultaneously scaffold the practitioners’ utilization of “best 
practice” methods that are needed to overcome incorrect 
automatic inferences and biases. Consequently, the co-robot 
would provide emotional and moral scaffolding for dignified 
and non-stigmatizing encounters that support the patient’s 
autonomous contributions to health and the practitioners’ aim 
of providing intervention that improves the patient’s health.  
      Specifically, co-robots who “know” the psychological 
states and traits of their patient, obtained during the 
comfortable and open exchange of information in the patient’s 
home, could (1) provide information that alerts the practitioner 
to consciously develop and analyze alternative explanations to 
immediate impressions, (2) provide feedback about the 
practitioner’s accuracy of patient states and traits, and (3) 
explicitly report data summaries of temporal patterns of health 
states (e.g., consistency of depressed mood) that help the 
practitioner to determine the need for intervention (e.g., 
depression therapy). All of these functions would augment 
what has been shown in the health research to be needed for 
practitioners to overcome their incorrect first impressions and 
biases [26]. These functions are particularly critical for 
chronic conditions such as PD that have complex and variable 
symptoms that are difficult for patients to track and self-report 
in their health care encounters. Furthermore, co-robotic 
mediation that occurs during the therapeutic encounter may 
prevent interpersonal self-fulfilling prophecies [30]. By 
believing highly masked patients to be less psychologically 
and socially capable than low-masked patients, practitioners 
may aggravate facial masking symptoms through their bias-
confirmatory behavior, thus perpetuating the apparent validity 
of their initial impressions. They may interview the patient 
differently based on facial expressiveness and consequently 
elicit different behavior, such as social withdrawal in the case 
of higher masking and social engagement in the case of lower 
masking. For example, Takahashi et al. [33] found that 
interviewers elicited more positive communication and 
engagement and less hopeless behavior when they asked 
adaptive-coping questions of people with PD (e.g., “what did 
you find satisfying last week? ”) compared to problem-
oriented questions (e.g., “what did you find difficult last 
week? ”). The co-robot might prompt the practitioner to ask 
adaptive-coping questions during the patient interview in 
addition to the more typical problem-oriented questions, and 
by so doing create a more informative, engaging and 
dignifying encounter. 
IV. APPROACH 
     Our earlier research yielded a robotic architecture (Fig. 1) 
capable of supporting a range of ethical activities [6].  We are 
in the process of expanding the ethical adaptor to incorporate 
new moral affective functions, such as empathy and 
compassion and revising and expanding the ethical governor 
to fit to this new healthcare domain. The relevant ethical 
components of the architecture are: 
1. Ethical Governor: A transformer/suppressor of system-
generated unethical action to permissible action. This 
deliberate bottleneck is introduced into the architecture, in 
essence, to force a second opinion prior to the conduct of 
a potential morally questionable behavioral response. 
2. Ethical Adaptor: This architectural component provides 
an ability to update the autonomous agent’s constraint set 
and ethically related behavioral parameters and guide 
action-selection for the robot. It uses a set of moral 
affective functions at run-time that are invoked in order to 
ensure proper robotic responses in guiding the patient-
caregiver relationship. 
While all these components are of value in the patient 
healthcare context, this research will focus largely on the 
ethical governor as a means to enforce behavior that supports 
maintenance of dignity, and the ethical adaptor, which will 
expand its moral affective inventory to include empathy, in 
addition to its already present model of guilt [7]. 
 
     For healthcare applications, we extend this earlier research 
into a broader class of moral emotions, such as compassion, 
empathy, sympathy, and remorse, particularly regarding the 
use of robots for PD, in the hopes of preserving human dignity 
as these human-robot relationships unfold. There is an 
important role for artificial emotions in personal robotics as 
part of meaningful human-robot interaction [5.18], and it is 
clear that value exists for their use in establishing long-term 
human-robot relationships. There are, of course, ethical 
considerations associated with this use of artificial emotions 
due in part to the deliberate fostering of attachment by human 
beings to artifacts, and a consequent detachment from reality 
by the affected user. Most view this as a benign, or perhaps 
even beneficial effect, not unlike entertainment or video 
games, but it can clearly have deleterious effects if left 
unchecked. Hence the need for incorporating models of 
morality within the robot itself in order to preserve the dignity 
of the humans involved in these relationships. 
 
 
Figure 1: Major Components of the Ethical 
Autonomous Robot Architecture [6]. 
V. MORAL EMOTIONS 
     Finding and creating suitable cognitive models for moral 
emotions is an ongoing challenge. This secondary class of 
emotions has been ignored to a high degree by many within 
the robotics and computer science community, with a few 
exceptions (e.g., [10]). Once it has been determined that the 
robot’s actions involve an empathy-inducing situation, it is 
necessary to compute the appropriate magnitude of empathy 
that should be expressed. We will use the same methods 
employed for our models for negative moral emotions  [7] to 
look at positive moral emotions and abstract these into models 
suitable for computational implementation. The ethical 
adaptor uses a modified version of the Smits and De Boeck 
model [29] to compute the system level of a moral emotion. 
     Using this first approximation, we express a positive moral 
emotion in terms of situational appraisal values, norm 
appraisals, other-evaluations, evaluations about the act that 
elicited the emotion, and motivation and action tendencies 
geared towards other-support. The model then assigns the 
probability for “feeling an emotion” as: 
 
where Pi,j is the probability of person i feeling the emotion in 
situation j, logit(x)=ln(x/(1 − x)), βj,k is the emotion-inducing 
power of component k in situation j, θi is the emotion’s 
threshold of person i, σk is the weight of component k 
contributing to the emotion, τ is an additive scaling factor, and 
aj is a scaling weight for situation j. In particular, instead of 
computing the probability that empathy results from some 
situation, the ethical adaptor computes the magnitude of 
empathy that robot i should experience in situation j as: 
Empathyi,j = aj(βj − θi). In the current implementation of the 
ethical adaptor, θi is an initial threshold set for the robot. As 
above, situational component weights, σk, ranging from 0 to 
infinity, represent the relative effect of each component. The 
additive factor τ is derived from user input. Finally, the weight 
for situation j, aj, is a scaling factor ranging from 0 to 1 and is 
related to the necessity of an empathic response. 
     Creating a computational model is one thing, embedding it 
into a robotic architecture is another. Fortunately, we have 
considerable experience in modeling and embedding affect in 
robotic systems, always based on models derived from 
cognitive science [4,5,19,25,28]. The infrastructure exists 
within our MissionLab system [11,17] to be able to facilitate 
the extension of this approach to lead directly to testing and 
evaluation.  
     In order to realize the goals of this research, the ethical 
adaptor must address three interrelated problems. The 
foremost of these is the problem of when empathy should be 
accrued by the system. Empathy, however, does not typically 
exist in a binary manner, but rather is present in variable 
amounts. Thus, it is also necessary to determine how much 
empathy should result from an empathy-inducing action. 
Finally, it is not enough for the robot to merely accrue 
empathy from its actions. It is also necessary to define how the 
ethical adaptor interacts with the underlying behavioral system 
in order to express its empathy in some manner through 
behavioral change. In this case, it will be done through the use 
of non-verbal (kinesics and proxemics) and verbal expressions 
tailored for the situation. 
     We use these emotions to bias behavior of robotic systems 
in human-robot interactions. Our initial focus is on positive 
moral emotions, and aim to maintain a theory-of-mind of the 
robot’s human counterpart in the relationship in order to act in 
manner that fosters their emotional state in a manner 
consistent with enhancing their dignity. Our recent work in 
this area, which we intend to expand upon and is related to the 
use of deception, appears in [38]. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has presented the directions and goals of an 
ongoing research project into the management of patient-
caregiver relationships for early stage Parkinson’s disease. 
Specific models for moral emotions are posited that can be 
used for both action-selection and kinesic expression that are 
hypothesized to lead to improved quality of care. 
As this is the beginning of a 5-year project much remains to 
be done, including the implementation and development of the 
theory of mind models and their importation into the requisite 
robotic architectures for this work.  Human subject studies 
will ultimately be needed to validate these methods. 
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